UNSC

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1. President's Letter

"The people who get on in this world are the people who get up and look for the circumstances they want, and, if they can't find them, make them." - George Bernard Shaw

Dear delegates

It's a pleasure for us, Juliana Bedoya and Gabriella Sankar, to give you a warm welcome to the XV version of CBEMUN and to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). It's an immense privilege being the ones that are able to preside over this committee, and to evaluate the different topics treated in the Security Council in the past, analyzing and developing them to a new and better outcome for the history of the world. We hope this experience of symbolizing influential nations in one of the six main organs of the United Nations will not only boost you with abundant knowledge, but will help you improve your speech and conflict-solving abilities. We aspire for this Model Of United Nations to grant a better understanding of the different issues treated in the past in this committee, and hopefully spark a wave of curiosity on how to be the ones that create substantial changes in past historical events.

As many other generations have said before us, our main goal with the event is to inspire these few days that we will be together to *"Do more than just watch."* We, with all and the best of our abilities, will strive to provide you with the greatest assistance and guidance needed to bring to life the space where you will be able to debate, discuss, inspect and negotiate. However you, the delegates, are the central core of this activity. We expect all of you to do your best of what you got and to prepare the best you can, engage with the material we give you and the one you will look for, and faithfully represent your honorable delegation. We hope to give you all the tools you need all the time in commission, but ultimately it is our duty to build and shape the best experience possible during your time in CBEMUN.

Keeping this in mind, we invite you to embrace completely your role in the commission. On this occasion you will have the opportunity to participate in one of the

most influential and powerful organs on the international landscape, with you being an important nation, capable of making strong decisions and restructuring prior issues. Therefore, the main goal of re-developing diplomatic solutions and creating a different outcome from the past to keep international security and peace, is achievable, and on this occasion, you are the ones with the chance to do so.

Sincerely,

Juliana Bedoya   Gabriella Sankar

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2. Introduction to the Committee
2.1 History

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the international community decided to create the United Nations (UN), an international organization with the main goal of maintaining international peace and security, and taking effective collective measures to prevent and remove threats to peace. The UN Charter is the UN's governing document, drafted by 50 states in the San Francisco Conference, from April 25 to June 26, 1945, and later signed by 51 nations. The document established the six main organs of the organization, the Secretariat, the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Trusteeship Council. The UN Charter came into force on October 24, 1945, after being ratified by China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and by a majority of other signatories. The first session of the Security Council was held on January 17, 1946, at Church House, Westminster, London. Since then, the Council's permanent residence was

relocated to the United Nations¨ Headquarters in New York City.

The Security Council not only has the primary purpose of preserving international peace and security, but it also contributes to the development of friendly relations between member states, and it creates a place to effectively cooperate in solving conflicts among nations. The Council, as stated in article 39 of the UN Charter: *"shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression*[1] *and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security."* Such decisions are agreed to be accepted and be carried out by the member states in accordance with the Charter[2]. This means that the Security Council has the authority to bind all members of the organization, and the members are obliged to follow the measures agreed upon in the Council's resolutions.

The Council consists of fifteen members, five permanent and ten non-permanent members. All members are granted one vote. Originally the 5 permanent states were the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the French Republic, and the Republic of China. Later the Republic of China would be replaced at the UN by the People's Republic of China on October 25, 1971, and the Soviet Union would be replaced by the Russian Federation on December 24, 1991. These five nations have veto power over any Council's resolution. The ten non-permanent members are elected for a two-year period, with no consecutive re-election, and are also chosen considering geographical distribution. There are 3 representatives from African countries, two from Latin America, two from Asia, two from Western Europe, and one from Eastern Europe.

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[1] Threat to peace: originally perceived exclusively to inter-state conflicts, but the idea has expanded to include   internal situations, violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, terrorism, climate change and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among others.
Breach of peace: less expansive term referring to specific acts that pose a significant threat to international peace and security.
Act of aggression: the term must be understood by the definition established in resolution 3314 of the General Assembly of 1974. *See* [A/RES/29/3314 - Definition of Aggression - UN Documents: Gathering a body of global agreements (un-documents.net)](#)

[2] *Article 25: The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.*

All decisions on procedural or non-substantial matters need a minimum of nine affirmative votes to pass. The veto power is not applicable in these cases. However, in decisions regarding substantial matters (resolutions), nine affirmative votes are required, including the concurring votes[3] of the five permanent members. Any member of the United Nations who is not a member of the Security Council can be invited to participate in discussions about a situation brought to the Council that especially affects that delegation, although it will not have the possibility to vote. If a member is a party to the dispute in an issue being discussed in the Council, it shall abstain from voting (Article 27 [3]). Finally, if the Security Council is unable to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security because of the exercise of the veto power of the permanent members in a decision of vital importance, members of the council may request, applying the General Assembly resolution 377(V) (United for peace), for the referral of the issue to the General Assembly so it can make the necessary recommendations.[4]

2.2 Powers

Despite having the particularity of being a historical committee, the HSC has the same powers and responsibilities of the UNSC currently. The UNSC has three sets of powers according to the Charter:

- Adjustment or settlement powers (Chapter VI)
- Enforcement powers (Chapter VII); and
- Regional arrangement powers (Chapter VIII)

2.2.1 Adjustment or settlement powers:

The Council, to peacefully resolve international disputes or situations that in principle do not pose a threat to peace yet, can take a number of non-coercive measures to settle the dispute. The SC can call upon the parties to a dispute to settle their dispute through *"negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice"* (Article 33 [2]). Also, the Council may investigate any dispute that might endanger

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[3] Abstention, non-participation, absence, or a vote in favor are considered as concurring.

[4] *See* https://ask.un.org/faq/177134 *and* A/RES/377%20(V) - E - A/RES/377%20(V) -Desktop (undocs.org)

international peace and security, and it can establish fact-finding missions and commissions of inquiry to fulfill such purposes. If the efforts mentioned in Article 33 fail to settle the conflict, the SC shall intervene recommending appropriate procedures, methods or terms of settlement, or referring the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), if necessary.

2.2.2 Enforcement powers:

When measures taken under Chapter VI result unsuccessful, the Security Council can take more assertive action under Article 39 by making non-binding recommendations or binding provisional decisions[5] on which process to follow, like issuing ceasefire directives that can help prevent an escalation of the conflict, or dispatching military observers - or a peacekeeping force - to help reduce tensions. In addition, the Council may decide for enforcement measures not involving the use of force, like complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. On the contrary, it may authorize the use of force by air, sea, or land.

2.2.3 Regional arrangement powers:

Chapter VIII allows regional arrangements or agencies to deal with matters related to the maintenance of international peace and security. If the arrangements and their activities comply with the Purposes and Principles of the UN, the matter addressed is deemed local and adequate for regional action. For an arrangement to be done, the SC needs to give authorization before undertaking any action and is kept fully informed of their activities.

The Security Council has the possibility of establishing subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions. They include Ad Hoc committees on sanctions, counterterrorism, and nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, Military Staff Committee and

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[5] To understand when Security Council's decisions are binding the ICJ said, in Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia case (1971), that *"the language of a resolution of the Security Council should be carefully analyzed before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect... the question whether they have in fact been exercised (powers of Article 25) is to be determined in each case, having regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked "*.

Peacekeeping Operations and Political Missions[6].

3. Topic A: Insurgency in Maghreb

3.1 Introduction

Terrorism, political unrest, and transnational crime have been the main causes of protracted insurgencies in the Maghreb region, which encompasses Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. Extremist organizations like the Islamic State (ISIS) and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have taken advantage of local weaknesses during the last 20 years, resulting in continuous war and instability.

Issues with poor governance, socioeconomic inequality, and instability in the larger Sahel region are all strongly associated with the insurgency in the Maghreb. Tensions were further heightened by the political upheavals that followed the 2011 Arab Spring, which ultimately caused the breakdown of governmental authority in several regions, most notably Libya. Porous borders have been exploited by armed organizations to create safe havens, carry out illegal operations including people trafficking and smuggling, and grow their networks of recruiters.

In counterinsurgency operations, the UN remains a crucial player, as do regional institutions like the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The goal of the international community's development programs, counterterrorism efforts, and peacekeeping deployments is to address the underlying causes of instability and advance lasting peace.

3.2 Historical Background

The Maghreb insurgency has developed over many years, influenced by colonial

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[6] For more information on subsidiary bodies, *see* Subsidiary Organs Branch | United Nations Security Council

histories, post-independence conflicts, and the emergence of extremist groups. The origins of contemporary insurgency in the area can be linked to the mid-20th century, especially the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962). Throughout this time, nationalist movements like the National Liberation Front (FLN) engaged in guerrilla warfare against French colonial troops. The struggle, marked by uneven warfare, guerrilla strategies, and government oppression, set the stage for upcoming militant actions in the area.

After gaining independence, numerous Maghreb nations encountered considerable internal issues, such as political turbulence, economic difficulties, and social disorder. Governments in Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco aimed to strengthen their authority, frequently resorting to authoritarian tactics and stifling dissenting groups. In Algeria, frustration with the ruling government intensified in the early 1990s, leading to a violent civil war (1991–2002) between the authorities and Islamist rebels. The annulment of the 1991 parliamentary elections, which were set to elevate the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) to power, resulted in the emergence of extremist factions like the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and subsequently the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). The violence led to the loss of more than 200,000 lives and firmly established insurgency methods in the area.

In the early 2000s, the insurgency adopted a more global nature. In 2007, the GSPC rebranded as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), aligning with the worldwide jihadist movement. AQIM extended its activities outside Algeria, executing assaults in Mali, Mauritania, Tunisia, and Libya. The group participated in abductions for ransom, trafficking weapons, and forming partnerships with other extremist groups, thereby reinforcing its presence in the area.

The 2011 Arab Spring revolts signified a pivotal moment in the security dynamics of the region. The well-known uprisings that overthrew enduring governments in Tunisia and Libya generated power voids that were rapidly seized upon by rebel factions. In Libya, the demise of Muammar Gaddafi resulted in the breakdown of government control, enabling militants to capture large caches of weapons and set up training facilities. The nation turned into a center for jihadist operations, with different groups vying for dominance. Tunisia, even with its comparatively stable political landscape, faced an increase in terrorist assaults, such as the Bardo Museum and Sousse beach massacres in 2015.

The rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) in the mid-2010s added complexity to the security landscape. Multiple extremist groups in the Maghreb have sworn loyalty to ISIS, heightening rivalries among jihadist factions. Libya emerged as a crucial conflict zone, as ISIS secured a base in Sirte until they were expelled by a U.S.-supported operation in 2016. In Algeria and Tunisia, smaller groups linked to ISIS conducted assaults, aiming at security personnel and civilians. The insurgency has also been driven by wider regional dynamics, especially the instability in the adjacent Sahel. Organizations like Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) have increased their impact, making the distinctions between the Maghreb and Sahelian uprisings less clear. These factions have exploited weak borders to transport combatants, arms, and illegal merchandise throughout North and West Africa, making counterinsurgency initiatives even more complex.

Throughout the years, different actors have sought to tackle the insurgency using military interventions, peacekeeping operations, and counterterrorism efforts. National governments in the area have carried out security crackdowns, frequently with assistance

from Western partners like France and the United States. Nonetheless, overly aggressive methods have occasionally intensified complaints, leading to increased radicalization. The United Nations, in collaboration with regional bodies like the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), remains vital in counterinsurgency initiatives. The international community aims to tackle the underlying causes of instability and foster lasting stability in the Maghreb through peacekeeping missions, development initiatives, and diplomatic negotiations.

3.3 Current Situation

The Maghreb area, which includes Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia, still struggles with a complicated and changing insurgency. Although the level of armed conflict varies, extremist organizations, political unrest, and transnational crime networks continue to present ongoing dangers to regional security. The insurgency has been influenced by various factors, such as ineffective governance, economic difficulties, leaky borders, and outside interventions. In spite of continuous counterterrorism initiatives, the situation continues to be unstable, with lasting stability reliant on both security actions and socio-economic improvements.

<u>Rise of Extremist Organizations and Ongoing Security Risks</u>

The Maghreb continues to be a focal point for extremist activities, featuring a complicated array of insurgent organizations active throughout the area. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Islamic State (ISIS) and its local branches, along with homegrown militant groups, remain a significant security danger. In spite of heightened counterterrorism measures by national governments and global partners, these organizations have adjusted by altering their operational tactics, moving into rural and mountainous regions, and utilizing technology to recruit and disseminate propaganda.

Algeria has traditionally been a center for insurgent operations, especially because of its extended conflict with jihadist organizations since the 1990s. Although the nation has successfully diminished AQIM's influence within its territory, occasional assaults and minor conflicts continue, especially in isolated regions. Tunisia, having faced significant terrorist incidents in 2015 that targeted tourists and security personnel, still struggles with the radicalization of specific parts of its populace, especially in neglected interior areas where extremist beliefs may flourish.

Libya continues to be the most unstable nation in the Maghreb, acting as a crucial hub for extremist organizations because of its divided political situation. Following the downfall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, the nation has been engulfed in disorder, as numerous militant groups exploit the power void to set up training facilities and amass armaments. Despite facing territorial losses in Libya, remnants of ISIS persist in desert regions, executing ambushes and suicide assaults on security personnel.

In Mauritania and certain regions of Morocco, insurgent activity has diminished in recent years, mainly because of vigorous counterterrorism operations. Nonetheless, both nations stay watchful against transnational incursions by extremist groups, especially from the Sahel area. The linked characteristics of jihadist movements in North Africa and the Sahel render the Maghreb an essential arena in the larger battle against terrorism.

Borders with Porosity and Networks of Transnational Criminals

The expansive, mostly unregulated desert terrains of the Maghreb have historically enabled the transit of insurgents, arms, and illegal items. The porous frontiers shared by Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Mauritania, and Mali enable militant groups to avoid security forces, traffic weapons, and create safe havens in isolated regions. The collapse

of Libya's central authority has worsened the situation, making the nation a major center for illicit arms trafficking. Arms from Libyan reserves, such as heavy artillery, surface-to-air missiles, and small firearms, have reached various terrorist organizations throughout the area. Transnational criminal organizations have enhanced their collaboration with insurgent groups, forming a mutually advantageous partnership where terrorists secure smuggling routes in return for financial support. Drug trafficking has emerged as a highly profitable venture, with North Africa acting as a key transit route for cocaine traveling from South America to Europe. The earnings from drug trafficking have supported insurgent operations, enabling militant organizations to acquire arms, enlist combatants, and finance their activities.

Human trafficking has increased as armed groups take advantage of migrant movements to earn income. Smuggling organizations move migrants from sub-Saharan Africa via the Maghreb, frequently enduring harsh and abusive situations. In certain instances, migrants have been coerced into joining armed factions, especially in war-torn areas where rebels hold power. The interplay of terrorism, organized crime, and human trafficking creates a significant and persistent security issue for Maghreb nations and the broader global community.

<u>Governance Deficiencies, Political Unrest, and State Vulnerability</u>

Ineffective governance and political uncertainty have served as significant facilitators of insurgency in the Maghreb. Numerous states in the area experience corruption, inefficiency, and weak democratic institutions, providing a breeding ground for extremist groups to take advantage of discontent and enlist new followers. The ongoing power conflicts in Libya, specifically, have resulted in a disorderly setting where armed factions and militias function with almost no restrictions.

Libya continues to be split among competing groups, such as the Government of National Unity (GNU) located in Tripoli and the eastern-aligned Libyan National Army (LNA). This political disunity has significantly weakened counterterrorism initiatives, as rival factions frequently place their own power conflicts ahead of national security. The lack of a cohesive security system has enabled militant groups to thrive in specific regions, especially in the south, where the central government's control is limited.

In Tunisia, ongoing government shifts, economic uncertainty, and public discontent with political leaders have fostered conditions conducive to radicalization. The nation possesses one of the highest per capita figures of foreign fighters who participated in ISIS in Syria and Iraq, underscoring the magnitude of the ideological difficulty it confronts. Algeria, while being more politically stable, has experienced increasing tensions regarding governance matters, with large-scale protests in recent years demanding reforms. Although the nation's security forces have a firm hold on counterinsurgency operations, ongoing political discontent might lead to weaknesses over time.

Mauritania and Morocco have upheld more stable political frameworks, yet they continue to encounter governance issues tied to social inequality and corruption. The existence of authoritarian inclinations in governmental frameworks has raised worries regarding human rights violations in counterterrorism efforts, which in certain instances have intensified resentment and advanced extremist stories. The success of governance in tackling insurgency involves not just military power but also fostering trust with local communities and improving the socio-economic factors that contribute to radicalization.

Interventions from Abroad and Counterinsurgency Actions

Global entities have been influential in influencing counterinsurgency initiatives in the Maghreb, albeit with varied outcomes. France, the United States, and local allies have been engaged in counterterrorism efforts, offering military support, sharing intelligence, and conducting drone operations aimed at prominent insurgents. Nonetheless, the exit of French troops from Mali in 2022, along with increasing anti-French feelings in some areas of North Africa, has sparked doubts regarding the viability of interventions led by foreign powers. The United Nations, African Union, and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have backed stabilization initiatives, yet regional collaboration continues to be uneven. For instance, Algeria has opposed foreign military involvement on its territory, opting to conduct counterterrorism efforts within its borders. The chaos in Libya has complicated coordinated efforts, as competing factions have varying strategies for security.

Counterinsurgency initiatives have centered on military actions, improvements in border security, and the sharing of intelligence. Nevertheless, numerous analysts contend that an exclusively military strategy is inadequate for tackling the root causes of insurgency. An increasing acknowledgment exists that counterterrorism efforts need to be combined with socio-economic initiatives, educational programs, and community involvement to address radicalization from its foundations.

Humanitarian Effects and Displacement of Civilians

The uprising in the Maghreb has resulted in significant humanitarian impacts, forcing thousands of civilians to flee and unsettling local economies. Warfare has compelled communities to escape, especially in Libya and certain areas of Algeria, where rebel actions continue to pose a danger. Alongside internal displacement, numerous migrants and refugees from the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa pass through the Maghreb,

frequently finding themselves stuck in conflict areas or preyed upon by human traffickers.

Women and children are uniquely impacted by the crisis, with numerous instances of violence, forced recruitment, and sexual exploitation. Rebel factions have attacked schools, especially in distant regions, worsening educational difficulties. The insurgency has also led to economic ruin, as foreign investments diminish and tourism-reliant economies, such as Tunisia, find it difficult to bounce back from security issues. The humanitarian effort has faced obstacles due to security issues, as aid groups find it difficult to reach areas impacted by conflict. Without ongoing efforts to enhance living conditions and deliver crucial services, communities continue to be susceptible to further radicalization and exploitation by extremist organizations.

https://www.foi.se/download/18.7fd35d7f166c56ebe0bb38c/1542369060229/Challenges-to-Peace-and-Security-in-North-Africa_FOI-Memo-5421.pdf

https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/overreach-in-africa-rethinking-us-counterterrorism-strategy/

https://thecjn.ca/news/houthis-public-safety-canada/ C

https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/The_Long_Jihad.pdf C

https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11854

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03932729.2020.1835324#abstract

https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/access/item:3309821/view

https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/exploiting-disorder-al-qaeda-and-islamic-state

3.4 Previous resolutions

Insurgency in Maghreb has been a prevalent issue in North Africa. There have been multiple approaches to combat the insurgency and give humanitarian aid to Maghrebis. Some of these resolutions are:

- **Joint Military Command (JMC):** Established in **April 2010,** the JMC includes Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. It aims to enhance regional cooperation against AQIM by coordinating military operations and intelligence sharing. Despite its formation, the effectiveness of this command has been hindered by differing national strategies and priorities among member states. Some of the problems it aimed to prevent and stop are: Mixing abduction of foreigners, car and cigarette smuggling, drug trafficking, and arms dealing. Some stand that AQIM purposes surpass the religious or political aim.

  https://africacenter.org/publication/regional-security-cooperation-in-the-maghreb-and-sahel-algerias-pivotal-ambivalence/

  https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/history

  https://www.cfr.org/blog/eu-task-force-takuba-mali

  https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel

  https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/strategy_for_security_and_development_in_the_sahel_en_0.pdf

- **Algerian Counterterrorism strategy:** Algeria has taken a leading role in regional security efforts, asserting itself as a pivotal actor in the fight against terrorism. The Algerian government has emphasized a military-centric approach while also attempting to centralize operations against AQIM through initiatives

like the Central Intelligence Cell, established to facilitate coordination among Saharan and Sahelian countries.

- **Operation serval:** Launched by France in **January 2013**, this military intervention aimed to stabilize Mali following an Islamist takeover. It significantly weakened AQIM's presence in the region, leading to a reduction in their operational capacity 4. This operation was later transformed into Operation Barkhane, which continues to

  support local forces against insurgent threats across the Sahel.

- **The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established by Security Council resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013:** In recent years, Mali has been confronted by a profound crisis with serious political, security, socio-economic, humanitarian and human rights consequences. Under the terms of the resolution, the mission would support the political process and carry out a number of security-related stabilization tasks, with a focus on major population centres and lines of communication, protecting civilians, human rights monitoring, the creation of conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and the return of displaced persons, the extension of State authority and the preparation of free, inclusive and peaceful elections.

- **G5 Sahel Force:** Formed in **February 2017**, this coalition consists of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. It is a counterterrorism force designed to combat militant groups across borders and enhance regional security cooperation 3. The G5 Sahel Force aims to address not only insurgency but also organized crime and humanitarian challenges. This has been supported by the US on various occasions with logistics and advisory support.

- **The EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel:** first adopted in **March 2011.** This strategy aimed to address the interconnected challenges of security and development in the region, particularly in response to the rising threats from groups like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other destabilizing factors. The strategy has evolved over the years, with subsequent action plans and initiatives reinforcing its objectives, including a significant update in 2021 to enhance focus on governance and state legitimacy in the Sahel region. It emphasizes improving governance, reducing terrorist threats, and enhancing local communities' access to basic services as part of a long-term approach to stability.

- **International support:** The involvement of international actors, including the United Nations and European Union, has been crucial in providing support for regional initiatives. The UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) plays a role in stabilizing the country post-conflict while addressing humanitarian needs.

3.5 QARMAS

a. Has your country been affected by AQIM? How?

b. Has your country had a similar terrorist threat to its national security? If so, how was it resolved?

c. Has your country helped with any of the investigations or prosecutions related to AQIM?

d. Does your country have a big number of followers of the Islamic State and AQIM?

e. Has your country contributed with the previous resolutions and the international community by sharing information to facilitate the capture and elimination of this terrorist group?

f. Has your country suffered or been affected indirectly by any of the attacks done by AQIM? How?

g. How does your country protect itself against terrorist groups?

3.6 Recommendations from the Chair

We highly recommend taking into account the mistakes that Maghreb has made in the past to tackle this problem. Use these to find a new solution with improvements. Try not to bring up previous resolutions into the debate, this would stall the flow of the committee. Please be innovative and work together. If your country is not directly affected by AQIM, try researching what has it done for Maghreb to combat this terrorist group and how it can be supported further. Don't be scared of giving new ideas and remember there will never be a perfect time to talk, so just do so anytime.

3.7 Glossary

a. **AQIM**: Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is a North Africa–based Sunni terrorist group that seeks to eliminate governments and Western influence in the region and to establish sharia (Islamic law). It has conducted attacks across North and West Africa that have killed hundreds, including Americans.

b. **ECOWAS**: The Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) is a regional group of fifteen countries, founded in 1975. Its mission is to promote economic integration in "all fields of economic activity, particularly industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions, social and cultural matters

c. **Insurgency**: An occasion when a group of people attempt to take control of their country by force

d. **ISIS**: The extremist armed group Islamic State (ISIS) has committed widespread and systematic abuses in areas under its control in Syria, Iraq, and Libya. ISIS has also claimed responsibility for deadly attacks in nearly 20 other countries, including Afghanistan, Egypt, France, Indonesia, Tajikistan, and the United

Kingdom.

e. **Counterterrorism**: action intended to prevent violence for political purposes

f. Transnational crime: Transnational crimes are violations of law that involve more than one country in their planning, execution, or impact.

g. **Radicalization**: the action or process of making someone become more radical (= extreme) in their political or religious beliefs

h. **Extremism**: the fact of someone having beliefs that most people think are unreasonable and unacceptable

3.8 Supporting links:

● https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel

● https://www.canada.ca/en/security-intelligence-service/corporate/publications/terrorism-in-north-africa-and-the-sahel-the-expansion-of-a-regional-threat/chapter-1-understanding-the-regional-strategy-of-al-qaeda-in-the-islamic-maghreb.html

● https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/access/item:3309821/view

● https://www.jstor.org/stable/26462959?seq=6

4. Country List:

1. Argelia
2. Marocco (al-Maghrib)
3. Tunisia
4. Libia
5. Portugal
6. Kingdom of Spain
7. Germany
8. Japan
9. India
10. Italy
11. Nigeria
12. United States of America
13. Russian Federation
14. French Republic
15. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
16. People's Republic of China
17. Mali
18. Niger

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